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INTRODUCTION
1963 will take its place in airline history for several
reasons. First, 1963 was the airline industry's fiftieth anni-
versary, and the sixtieth anniversary of powered flight. It
was also the year in which the first orders were placed for the
commercial supersonic jet transport which will bring about an-
other new era in air transportation in the 1970' s. But most
significant, 1963 will probably mark the end of the transitional
phase from propeller driven aircraft to jet powered aircraft, and
the year in which most airline managements emerged successfully
from their struggles to solve the economic problems of the jet
age.
The jet transitional period was considerably shorter than
anticipated by many authorities, including representatives of the
transport industry, but the economic problems were acute and the
2
resulting industry recession was serious. The two-fold objec-
tive of this report was: (1) to examine the primary economic
problems experienced by the American scheduled airline industry
during the jet conversion period of 195S to 1963; and (2) to ana-
lyze the financial effects of these problems.
Much information contained in this report was obtained from
John Durant, "The Airlines at 50," New York Times . Dec. 3,
1963, p. 3» A contract to fly passengers on a scheduled basis
was signed by the St. Petersburg-Tampa Airline Co. and the city
of St. Petersburg on Dec. 17, 1913. First scheduled flight oc-
curred on Jan. 1, 1914.
2
"New Transport Equipment," editorial, Aviation Week and
Space Technology
. July S, 1963, p. 13
.
the literature, primarily periodicals, dealing with the airline
industry. Emphasis was placed on selecting material for its wide
range of applicability and its credibility. Statistical charts
and tables were developed from government and airline industry
sources to assist in the examination of the industry's problems,
and to provide insight into the significant changes brought about
as a result of the conversion to jets. Further information about
industry problems was obtained by the author in an interview with
the comptroller of Northwest Airlines.
Basically, the approach to the study was to determine: what
factors caused the industry recession during the 1953-1963 jet
conversion period; what major industry problems developed; and
the approximate financial loss to the owners of the airlines in-
volved. Before analyzing the problems encountered, certain back-
ground information is presented to provide the reader with a per-
spective of this rapidly growing industry and its status at the
beginning of the jet age.
Segment of the Industry Considered
There are seven classes of operators in the scheduled
transport industry of the United States. The classifications
are those used by the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal
Aviation Agency in connection with their Regulation of the in-
dustry.*'
•*FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation 1962 . Federal Aviation
Agency, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1963, p.
78.
1. The Domestic Trunk Lines consist of eleven carriers which
operate primarily on high-density traffic routes of the United
States. The eleven airline firms are:
American Airlines, Inc. Northeast Airlines, Inc.
Braniff Airways, Inc. Northwest Airlines, Inc.
Continental Air Lines, Inc. Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. United Air Lines, Inc.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. Western Air Lines, Inc.
National Airlines, Inc.
2. The International and Territorial Lines include seventeen
U. S. flag carriers that are certified to operate between the
United States and foreign countries. Nine of these (American,
Braniff, Delta, Eastern, National, Northwest, TWA, United, and
Western) are primarily domestic trunk airlines listed in class-
ification number one above which have extensions into foreign
countries. The other eight are:
Alaska Airlines, Inc. Pan American World Airways, Inc.
Caribbean Atlantic Air- Samoan Airlines, Ltd.
lines, Inc. South Pacific Air Lines
Mackey Airlines, Inc. Transportation Corporation of
Pacific Northern Air- America
lines, Inc.
3. Thirteen Domestic Local Service Lines
r
sometimes referred
to as feeder lines or regional lines, operate between smaller
traffic centers and between these centers and the principal cen-
ters:
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. Ozark Air Lines, Inc.
Bonanza Air Lines, Inc. Pacific Air Lines, Inc.
Central Airlines, Inc. Piedmont Aviation, Inc.
Frontier Airlines, Inc. Southern Airways, Inc.
Lake Central Airlines, Inc. Trans-Texas Airways, Inc.
Mohawk Airlines, Inc. West Coast Airlines, Inc.
North Central Airlines, Inc.
4. Two Intra -Hawaiian Carriers operate between the islands
of the State of Hawaii:
Aloha Airlines, Inc. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.
5. Seven Intra-Alaskan Carriers provide scheduled airline
service within the State of Alaska:
Alaska Coastal-Ellis Air- Northern Consolidated Air-
lines lines, Inc.
Cordova Airlines, Inc. Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc.
Kodiak Airways, Inc. Western Alaska Airlines, Inc.
Howard J . Mays Airlines
6. Four Helicopter Carriers operate in New York City, Chi-
cago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco/Oakland.
7. Five All-Cargo Lines operate under temporary certifi-
cates authorizing scheduled cargo flights:
Aerovias Sud Americana, Inc. Seaboard World Airlines, Inc.
Airlift International, Inc. The Slick Corporation
The Flying Tiger Line, Inc.
With one exception, only Domestic Trunk Lines and carriers
having both domestic trunk and international operating certifi-
cates (Groups 1 and 2 above) are considered in this paper, be-
cause these were the carriers primarily concerned with the tran-
sition from propeller-powered planes to jet-powered aircraft.
The exception is a major international carrier, Pan American
World Airways, Inc. Although it has no domestic operations,
Pan American is included in this report because it has a sizable
jet-powered fleet, e.g., 64 of the 73 turbojet aircraft listed
in Table 1 for International and Territorial Carriers belong to
Pan American. Thus the report considered operations of the
twelve U. S. scheduled carriers that introduced 402, or 97.8 per-
cent, of the 411 pure jet-powered aircraft in scheduled airline
operation as of June 30, 1963. Table 1 shows the number and type
of aircraft in scheduled air carrier operations on June 30, 1963.
Table 1. Total aircraft by type of engine in scheduled air
carrier operations: June 30, 1963.4
Total
turbine
and •
Turbine
Carrier : Turbojet : Turboprop
classification
\ piston
;
Total
;
(Pure Jet); (Propeller); Piston
Domestic Trunk
Carriers* 1,095 521 338 183 574
International
and Territo-
rial Carriers 156 73 73 __ 83
Local Service
Carriers 383 38 MOB 38 345
Intra-Alaska
Carriers 53 5 „_ 5 48
Intra-Hawaii
Carriers 18 6 __ 6 12
Helicopter
Carriers 17 __ mmmm — — 17
All-Cargo
Carriers 89
1,811
21 — 21 68
Total 664 411 253 1,147
Includes air carriers having both domestic and inter-
national/territorial operating certificates.
The Industry's General Situation
Before the Jet Conversion Period, 1958-1963
Dynamic growth in aviation and air transportation followed
the passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938. In 1938,
there were 22 certified route air carriers providing scheduled
air transportation over a network of short-hop operations. Six-
teen of these 22 carriers formed the nucleus of what is today
termed the domestic trunk industry. By 1958, certified air
carriers totaled 51 and provided long and medium-haul trunk
*U. S. Civil Air Carrier Fleet
,
2nd Quarter 1963, Federal
Aviation Agency, Washington, D. C, p. 14.
service in domestic, overseas, and foreign operations; provided
local service which connected smaller communities with major
traffic centers; provided domestic, overseas, and international
all-cargo service; and provided helicopter service in major
cities. The growth during those twenty years in the size and
complexity of the regulated civil airline industry can be mea-
sured partially by data presented in Table 2.
Table 2. Comparison of airline operational data, 1933 and 1958.
• • •
: : : Times
; 1933 : 1953 ; increased
Domestic certified route-miles 39,300 254,100 6.5
Foreign and territorial certified
route miles 31,100 323,300 10.6
Domestic revenue ton-miles of
certified airlines (millions)
per year 53 2,656 45.3
Domestic revenue plane-miles flown
by certified airlines
(millions) per year 76 734 9.7
Scheduled revenue-passenger miles
flown (millions) per year 533 29,420 55.2
Passengers (thousands) per year 1,306 50,000 33.3
Average seats per domestic trunk-
line aircraft 13.9 56.2 4.0
Number of scheduled aircraft 311 1,753 5.7
Invested air transport industry
capital (millions) $54 $1,307 24.0
Operating revenues per year
(millions) $57 $2,009 35.2
The period between 1933 and the entry of the United States
into World War II has been characterized by the term "regulated
expansion." For the first time, commercial aviation was guided
by a unified national policy and a single federal agency. During
5
-'John H. Frederick, Commercial Air Transportation
. 5th
Edition, p. 91.
the war, the domestic airlines were curbed by lack of equipment;
but still they managed to maintain their prewar operating mileage.
The average passenger load factor rose from 64 percent in 1941 to
a near capacity 91 percent in 1944.
World War II taught the American public that a ready air
capability in conflict and in peace was essential. A total of
132,000 military aircraft, including a variety of ocean spanning
7
aircraft, was produced in 1943 and 1944. Air-ground communica-
tions, radar, more and better airports, air route systems, and a
vast air traffic control system were developed to serve wartime
aviation needs. Following the war, the scheduled airlines cap-
italized on these facilities and aircraft to bring the public
safer, faster, more efficient, and more comfortable air travel.
At the close of the war, the airline industry was faced
with the need for large-scale operations and the problems of
rapid re-equipping and expansion programs. The domestic air-
fleet was expanded from a total of 37# commercial aircraft in
October, 1945, to about 700 aircraft by October, 1946. The
domestic trunk industry grew during the postwar adjustment period
in spite of operational and re-equipping difficulties; and in
1950, the industry moved into an era of unprecedented financial
success. Industry officials were generally optimistic in 1955
and 1956, when the first orders were placed for pure jet-powered
aircraft. There was confidence that traffic would continue to
6Ibid., p. 76.
'Air Transportation
. 1964 Facts and Figures, Air Transport
Association of America, p. 7.
sgrow at the post-World War II annual rate of 10-1$ percent. To
reinforce this confidence, the certified airlines ordered 230
turbojet aircraft by 195#, most of which were scheduled for de-
o
livery by the end of I960.
The Industry During Jet Conversion
The first turbojet aircraft went into domestic airline
passenger service in December, 195S. By 1959 there were six
turbojets in operation, 34 by the end of I960, 202 by 1961, and
a total of 319 by the end of 1962. The jet re-equipment pro-
gram was one of the most extensive modernization programs ever
undertaken by a single industry. Direct investment through 1962
for jet equipment exceeded $3 billion by an industry whose in-
vestment at the end of 1953 totaled only $1.7 billion. In addi-
tion, another one-half billion dollars was invested in mainte-
11
nance facilities and ground equipment for the jet aircraft.
The industry outlook continued to be optimistic during the
first months of the jet transitional period. There was quick
passenger acceptance of jets—about 90 percent of the seats were
sold. The problem was to find enough jet seats to satisfy the
customers' clamor. In 1959 > American Airline's Vice President
^Handbook of Airline Statistics . 1962 Edition, Civil Aero-
nautics Board, Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office,
1963, p. 469.
^Frederick, op. cit., p. 92.
1°FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation , op. cit . . p. 61,
llnCivil Aviation," The Aerospace Year Book . 1962, p. 237.
of Sales, Charles A. Rheinstrom, said, "American has under-
estimated the market and ordered too few jets," although American
Airlines had 50 additional Boeing 707 T s on order for delivery in
1961. 12
But by I960 it was obvious that a different situation was
developing. Traffic was not increasing at the post-World War II
annual rate, and a general decline in earnings set the scene for
industrial crisis. Airlines had heavily debt-financed purchase
of jets, and as a result, between 1955 and I960 their borrowed
capital increased from 2& percent of total capitalization to over
56 percent. ' Equity financing to ease the high debt ratio was
out of the question because of unattractive earnings. Airline
shares lagged far behind the market during the period mid-1955
through late 1957, and again during the period mid-1959 through
mid-1962. 14
The most dismal financial year for the airline industry was
1961, when most members were locked into stiff repayment sched-
ules and excess seating capacity reached a new high. The indus-
try experienced a $34.6 million loss in 1961. The industry
passenger load factor dropped from 61.4 percent in 1959, to 56.2
percent in 1961, and to 53.3 percent in 1962. * The technology
1 o
^"Jet Earns Money Around Clock," Business Week . August 22,
1959, p. 63.
13
-'"New Jets Coming and Tougher Financing," Business Week,
January 7, 1961, p. 42.
1/f
"Airlines Attain Maturity," Financial World . Jan. 1, 1964,
p. $3.
^Airlines 1964 . American Research Council, p. 10.
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of jet power and speed revolutionized the hauling capacity of
the airlines, and as a result, their available business was
diluted to such a degree that all domestic trunk carriers were
suffering.
Increased competition led to a flurry of merger proposals.
The general feeling was that the industry had reached a turning
point— either it must, with Civil Aeronautics Board encourage-
ment and approval, reduce the level of competition through a
series of mergers, route adjustments, and suspensions; or face
continued poor earnings. After an extended series of hearings,
only one merger was approved—the nearly bankrupt Capital Air-
lines into United Airlines—thereby reducing the number of
domestic trunk lines from twelve carriers to eleven.
16
American-Eastern Merger Case . Civil Aeronautics Board,
Docket 13355, July 12, 1963
7
11
PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
The Competitive Environment
Carriers in the airline industry have certain character-
istics that influence economic adjustments in the industry. In
the opinion of Dr. John H. Frederick, these characteristics
17
are: (1) the industry is "affected with the public interest"
similar to other carriers and utilities and, therefore, subject
to government regulation; (2) airlines are not "natural monop-
olies"— strong competition exists and more would exist if gov-
ernmental policies did not prevent it; and (3) rapid techno-
logical progress in flight equipment often makes equipment
obsolete long before it is physically worn out.
While the scheduled airline industry has some character-
istics of a public utility, it is not monopolistic because of
strong competition from (1) other airlines, (2) unpredictable
future changes in government regulated route patterns, and (3)
other forms of transportation. Dr. Frederick, in his Commercial
Air Transportation , listed the major differences between the
commercial airline industry and "regulated" industries such as
electric, gas, telephone, water, and railroad: 1
1. The airlines operate with a much higher ratio
of expenses to revenues, and with a high labor component
in relation to revenues and expenses.
2. The airline industry has a substantial amount of
17
'Frederick, ojo. cit., p. 126.
^Frederick, 0£. cit., p. 127.
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investment in flying equipment having a relatively short
life due to both physical deterioration and obsolescence.
This is one of the factors resulting in a net property
rate base which, comparatively, is much smaller than that
of the ordinary regulated utilities in relation to oper-
ating revenues.
3. The airlines are affected to an exceptional de-
gree by continuous technological developments and radical
changes in basic operating equipment.
4. Utility services such as electric, gas, water, and
telephone are used daily by practically every connected
customer. However, airline travel is not in the same con-
stant, essential public use category, and probably will be
much more vulnerable to diminished patronage in times of
economic stress when consumer decision is involved; the
decision to use is not automatic. In the use of air trans-
portation, at least three major decisions are usually in-
volved: Is this trip necessary? Shall I go by air, car,
or train? Shall I fly Eastern or National or some other
airline?
Competition between carriers was a prime factor in the
scramble to procure jet aircraft and enter the jet age. When
two or more carriers serve the same markets, neither can afford
not to have aircraft equal to or better than competition.
Mr. Louis J. Hector, member of the Civil Aeronautics Board, of-
fered the following explanation as to why the airlines rushed
into placing orders for jet aircraft: *
The airline industry is in many respects different
from the usual public utility, and I feel that sound reg-
ulation requires careful consideration of its peculiar
characteristics. I know of no industry, for instance,
where the exact character of the major capital invest-
ment is of such critical interest to the ultimate con-
sumer. By and large, people want to ride on the latest
and best plane, and it is pretty clear that they will
flock to the airline that offers it. This is quite un-
like other utilities. The purchaser of electricity cares
yLouis J. Hector, "Problems in Economic Regulation of
Civil Aviation in the United States," Journal of Air Law and
Commerce
. Winter 1959, p. 104.
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only about its reliability and price. He is not really
interested in whether his electricity is produced by coal,
oil, water, or atomic reaction. The purchasers of most
commodities do not care in what kind of factory they are
made so long as the product is satisfactory. Even the
railroad passenger is not too choosy what kind of loco-
motive pulls the train, provided his particular coach
is comfortable. But the airline passenger walks out on
the loading ramp, looks over the piece of capital equip-
ment that is to perform his service, then climbs right
up inside of it—and he wants the latest and best.
In a very real sense the airlines' major capital in-
vestment is the very product they sell the public. A
carrier with a plane which does not have public appeal
has no alternative in the long run but to get rid of it
and buy the type of equipment that the public demands.
Financing the Jets
The airline industry faced major re- equipping programs
after World War II, and during the early 1950' s, but none as
drastic and costly as the transition from propeller driven air-
craft to jet-powered aircraft. The cost trend for airliners
and related operating equipment increased steadily over the
years, as reflected in the approximate prices of airliners
over the years:
Table 3« Trend in cost of airliners. 20
Aircraft
:
Year
? introduced
Approximate price
per aircraft
when introduced
DC-3 (Propeller)
DC-4 (Propeller)
DC-6 (Propeller)
Lockheed Constellation (Propeller]
DC-7 (Propeller)
Jet Liner
1936
1945
1947
1951
1953
1955
100,000
450,000
Jl, 000, 000
>1, 250,000
>2, 000, 000
$6,000,000
20CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics . 1962, op., cit
. ,
p. 500.
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Financing aircraft from the early days of the DC-3 through
procurement of the DC-7's and Constellations was accomplished
with fairly conventional methods—equity financing and short-
term borrowing. Increasing cash flows, consisting of deprecia-
tion recoveries and retained earnings, served as downpayment on
newer models. But financing the jets soon led to a change in
the capital structures of the airlines. Long-term debt repre-
sented a major part of the typical capitalization structure in
the purchase of jet aircraft. Table 4 (page 15) compares debt
as a percentage of total capital in 1956, just before the fi-
nancing of the jet age got under way, and 1962, when the first
round of financing was complete.
Some of the carriers did not take advantage of the oppor-
tunity to provide equity financing for their new jets when the
market was favorable. As a result, many of the airlines were
forced to resort to long-term borrowing to pay for their jets.
One such airline was Delta. Delta Vice President, Todd G. Cole,
stated, "In 1956 we sold 125,000 shares of common for $4.4 mil-
lion. At the time we planned to do substantially more equity
financing but the bottom dropped out of the market for airline
stocks, so we resorted to debt financing to a much greater ex-
21tent than we preferred." ' A few turned to leasing jet equip-
ment as a means of reducing the need to raise money. As of
October 31, 1962, Boeing Aircraft Company had on lease nine
large jets to Northwest, two to Pan American, five to TWA, ten
21
"New Jets Coming and Tougher Financing," op., cit . . p. 42.
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Table 4. Long-term debt as a percentage of total
capitalization.*
Carrier 1956
22
1962
23
American
Eastern
TWA
United
Braniff
Capital
Continental
Delta
National
Northeast
Northwest
Western
Total Trunk
Pan American
20.4$ 69.1$
35.4 66.9
43 .4 SO.
2
34.5 59. a
16.7 43.2
77. 3 *#
59.0 63.3
30.2 49.3
24.1 61.5
17.1 73.9
31.5 55.7
39.2 52.6
36.0$ 65.6$
39.0$ 63.7$
^Capitalization = long-term debt, preferred stock, common
stock, other paid-in capital, retained earnings, less treasury-
stock. 2^
**Included in United Airlines figure. Merged with United
June 1, 1961.
to Eastern, and General Dynamics Corporation had leased six jets
to Northeast. ' Another financing method was to induce aircraft
manufacturers to do part of the financing, either by getting
the manufacturers to accept unneeded propeller driven aircraft
as trade-ins at good prices, or "by giving purchase money
22
CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics , op., cit
. ,
pp. 350-365,
3
"U. S. Airline Assets and Liabilities - Dec. 31, 1962,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology . April 29, 1963, p. 41.
*Paul M. Van Arsdell, Problem Manual in Corporation Fi-
nance , p. 11.
2
->"Legal Aspects of Aircraft Financing, Part II," Journal
of Air Law and Commerce
. Autumn 1963, p. 299.
paper."
16
26
Dr. Frederick stresses the serious implications of the air-
lines' rapid increase in debt in connection with the ability of
27
airlines to face economic fluctuations.
A substantial part of the industry should be
able to weather reasonable economic fluctuations as they
may occur. If, on the other hand, the financial struc-
ture of the industry is such that it endangers continued
operations in the face of a general economic decline, it
may be properly said that the air transportation system
is not soundly financed. The danger in the present amount
of long-term or funded debt is that it imposes relatively
heavy fixed charges on an industry whose margin of revenue
after operating expenses has fluctuated from time to time
and, on the average, has been low.
During the jet transition period, the airlines were generally
able to meet their heavy interest payments because of substan-
tial cash flows by way of depreciation recoveries (jets were
written off in 12-14 years ) and retained earnings. Figure 1
reflects the trend of cash flow and interest on long-term debt
for the domestic trunks for the period 1957-1963.
Excess Capacity
"Too many seats and too few passengers" was an oft-stated
phrase to describe the source of the airlines' woes during the
conversion to jets. Excess capacity was not the sole reason,
"New Jets Coming and Tougher Financing," op., cit . , p. 42,
27Frederick, op_. cit., p. 332.
2
°National and TWA in their 1962 annual reports and Ameri-
can in its 1963 annual report state that accelerated methods of
depreciation are used for federal income tax purposes while the
straight-line method is used for accounting purposes.
17
Millions
of
dollars
300
250
200
150
100
50
oL
* *Cash Flow >
,' .
—
••^'
Interest on
Long-term Debt
300
250
200
150
100
50
1957 195^ 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963
Cash
flow $175 #134 #233 #217 #232 #290 #295
Interest
on long-
term
debt #16 #24 #32 #44 #62 #72 #69
*Cash Flow = depreciation recoveries plus retained earnings.
Fig. 1. Trend of cash flow and interest on long-term debt for
the domestic trunks, 1957-1963. 29
29Ajr Transportation , op . cit.
,
p. 24.
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but it was a major contributor. Periodically, trunk airlines
went through cycles of buying new aircraft that created serious
financial problems for many of them. Yet each time, traffic ex-
30panded and most of them emerged successfully. There were two
major re-equipping phases prior to the jet age: 1945-1946, to
rebuild the civil airline "fleets; and in the early 1950' s, to
obtain bigger propeller aircraft. But, the jet re-equipping
phase in 195& developed into a more severe crisis. The Civil
Aeronautics Board commented on the industry's condition during
31
a merger hearing;
The air carriers' problems are not simple, and no
single cause or easy remedy of profit decline is apparent.
It is obvious that it stems in large part from the fact
that the industry entered into a vast jet-purchase pro-
gram in the late fifties which was geared to an antici-
pated growth in traffic that did not develop.
Table 5 compares carriers' traffic estimates (revenue pas-
senger miles) with actual traffic carried. Note that in 1961
traffic was 25 percent less than projected.
Some factors that contributed to overcapacity were: (1) the
failure of traffic to develop, and -(2) the fact that the first
jet aircraft were so big capacity-wise that (3) it was difficult
in many markets to operate frequent schedules without exceeding
the market's need. Table 6 indicates the tremendous increase in
daily seat-mile productive capacity of jet aircraft over selected
previous aircraft.
30"Too Many Seats in the Sky" Business Week, April 23,
1960, p. 76.
31
American-Eastern Merger Case , op . cit . . p. 30.
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Table 6. Increase in daily seat-mile productive capacity of
jets over previous aircraft. 33
'
* *
•
Available
No. • * Available : seat-miles
Aircraft type : of : Average: seat-miles: per 10-hour
•
seats : speed:
• •
per hour- : day
Boeing 707-320 (jet)
Boeing 707-120B (jet)
126 494 62,244 622,440
IIS 502 59,236 592,360
Lockheed Slectra
(Turboprop) 72 283 20,736 207,360
Viscount (Turboprop)
BC-7 (Propeller)
52 261 13,572 135,720
74 271 20,054 200,540
Constellation
(Propeller) 70 243 17,010 170,100
BC-6 B (Propeller) 68 225 15,300 153,000
DC-4 (Propeller) 54 163 8,302 88,020
DC-3 (Propeller) 22 145 3,190 31,900
The pause in airline passenger traffic growth between 1959
and 1962 occurred at a time when airline capacity was growing
most rapidly (refer to Fig. 2 and Table 7.).
At the same time, hours-per-day use of aircraft, as re-
flected in Table 8, was decreasing. This poorer utilization
rate of flight equipment further indicated the extent to which
equipment capacity exceeded the traffic available at the time.
The industry passenger load factor—the percentage of the
available seat miles actually sold—continued a downward trend
as the passenger carrying capacity of the airlines increased.
33Ameri can-Ba st era Merger Case , op . cit . . Appendix 4.
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Billions
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miles
70
65
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20
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1C
Total Available
Seat Miles
**First Class
'* Revenue Passenger Miles
Coach Revenue Passenger
Miles
1956 1957 1953 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
Fig. 2. Trend of total available seat-miles and revenue passen-
ger miles by class of service, domestic trunk lines,
1956-1963. 3*
34 nJ L. L. Doty, "Trunk Lines Face Management Transition,
Aviation Week and Space Technology . March 16, 1964, p. 161.
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Table 8. Revenue hours per aircraft per day in domestic and
nonscheduled operations of the domestic trunk
carriers, 1955-1961.3°
Calendar : Aircraft days : Aircraft revenue : Revenue hours per
year ; assigned : hours flown : aircraft per day
1955 335,018 2,565,664 7:39
1956 354,963 2,787,603 7:51
1957 395,004 3,118,581 7:54
1958 402,017 3,008,434 7:29
1959 422,889 3,115,793 7:22
1960 430,051 2,795,575 6:30
1961 403,678 2,396,907 5j_56
A comparison of load factors by airline for the years 1961,
1962, and 1963 is shown in Table 9, and the industry load factor
trend is shown in Fig. 3»
Table 9. Trends in individual carrier passenger load factors,
1961-1963
«
37
Carrier "7~ 1961 ! 1962 j 1963
*
American
Eastern
TWA
United
Braniff
Continental
Delta
National
Northeast
Northwest
Western
Trunk Total
Pan American
62% 57% 59%
50 48 50
57 51 53
51 53 53
5$ 54 54
48 46 51
60 61 61
55 54 52
50 53 50
54 52 51
55 53 54
56.2J6 53.3% 53.9%
59% 5&% 57.2%
^&American-Ea stern Merger Case
, op . cit
.
, Appendix 42.
3
'Aviation Week and Space Technology . April 29, 1963, p. 41,
and March 16, 1964.
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1956 1957 195B 1959 I960 1961 1962 1963
Passenger
load
factor $ 64.1 61.5 60.0 61.4 59.5 56.2 53-3 53.9
Fig. 3. Passenger load factor trend of the domestic trunklines,
1956-1963 .38
3^CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics . 1962, and Aviation Keek &
Space Technology , March 16, 1964, p. 164.
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Depressed Earnings
The upward surge in passenger traffic in 1963 , and a re-
versal of the downward trend in the load factor helped to break
the industry recession which had depressed profit margins for
the previous five years. The recovery did not come, as in the
past, through bettering the load factor, but rather it appears
to have been brought about by reducing operating costs and
learning to operate with the lower load factors.
Airline revenues gained steadily during the jet transition,
as indicated in Table 10, but poor earnings made it difficult to
raise equity financing to ease the high debt ratio.
Table 10. Trends in revenues, operating ratios, and profit
margins on sales, domestic trunk airlines, 1955-
1962.39
! Total ! Total Profit
Year ! operating ! operating ! Operating!
[ratio {%]'.
Net profit! margin
.
revenues
. expenses or (loss) ! on sales (fo)
($000 omitted)
1955 $1,132,234 $1,009,615 39. 2$ $62,934 5.6%
1956 1,262,332 1,162,230 92.0 57,352 4.6
1957 1,419,615 1,377,521 97.0 27,023 1.9
1953 1,513,250 1,413,125 93.7 44,794 3.0
1959 1,793,610 1,693,374 94.1 61,632 3.4
I960 1,942,635 1,907,735 93.2 63
1961 2,026,363 2,033,937 100.4 (34,567) ——
—
1962 2,250,231 2,174,137 96.6 11,233 0.5
In air transportation, an operating ratio of 90 percent or
higher was normal for the jet transition period. The extremely
39
40
Air Transportation 1963 . op . cit . . p. 26.
Frederick, pjp.. cit . . p. 332.
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high ratios increased the sensitivity of the industry to changes
in volume of traffic. Further, the industry incurred a large
proportion of expenses which did not vary directly with the vol-
ume of business. Thus, the airlines had a high break-even point.
A primary reason the industry was able to develop a break-
even load factor below the industry load factor was due to the
reduced operating cost of the jet-powered aircraft. In 1962 and
1963, as in I960 and 1961, the unit direct operating costs
(maintenance, fuel, flight crew, and depreciation) of the four-
engine jets were significantly lower than those of either piston-
engine or turboprop aircraft (refer to Table 11).
Table 11. Operating costs per seat mile, 1961-1963.
Type of aircraft ! 1961 ! 1962 I 1963
» •
Jet 1.75 cents I.64 cents 1.50 cents
Turboprop 2.43 cents 2.35 cents 2.36 cents
Propeller 2.48 cents 2.75 cents 2.61 cents
The greater economic efficiency of the jets was evident also
in the 1962 ton-mile costs. Trunk airline jets averaged direct
operating cost per available ton-mile of 12.15 cents. The costs
for turboprop and four-engine piston aircraft in passenger ser-
vice were 19.22 cents and 21.85 cents, respectively. However,
^•"Direct Operating Costs of Transport Aircraft in Airline
Service 1962," Federal Aviation Agency, August, 1963, p. 4, and
"Direct Operating Costs and Other Performance Characteristics
of Transport Aircraft in Airline Service 1963," FAA, July, 1964,
p. 5.
42Ibid .. 1963, p. 4.
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there was considerable variation in unit costs of the aircraft
types within each category, and to a certain extent the figures
reflected the shorter trip distances of the turboprop and piston
aircraft.
The industry continued to have low rates of return on in-
vestment throughout the transitional period (reference Table 12).
In November, I960, the CAB announced that domestic airlines
should earn an average return of 10^ percent on invested capital
(defined as stockholder equity plus long-term debt). More
specifically, the Big Four (United, American, Eastern, and TWA)
should earn 10£ percent, with the other seven trunks earning
11 1/8 percent. From 1950 to 1955, the industry earned returns
on invested capital of 10-15 percent; but by 1956, heavy equip-
ment expenditures started a downward trend of rate of return on
invested capital for the individual airlines as shown in Table 12.
The Editors of Forbes applied their statistical yardsticks
to 246 companies and 16 major industries to test them for growth
and profitability during 1962. In the category of growth, the
airline industry was rated number one—the fastest growing in-
dustry since 1957. The industry medians for sales were 12.5
percent, and earnings of 6.8 percent. In the category of pro-
fitability, the airline industry was rated number five. Medians
were: return on equity, 5.9 percent; cash flow to equity, 30.6
, 44-
percent; and operating profit margin, 16.4 percent.
43-
"Management Performance," Forbes , January 1, 1964, p. 18.
'The Aerospace Year Book, op., cit
. ,
p. 237.
44
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Increased Competition
While jets offered greater passenger capacity, traffic
(measured in terms of revenue passenger miles) increased only
4.1 percent in I960, and 1.1 percent in 1961, as compared to the
historical post-World War II growth pattern of 10-15 percent per
year (reference Fig. 3). A wave of pessimism swept over the do-
mestic trunk airline industry. Several major airlines initiated
merger proposals to eliminate what they considered to be exces-
sive competition. Those most actively engaged in the merger
movement were United and Capital, American and Eastern, and Pan
American and TWA.
Commenting on the trunklines' route structure, Mr. C. R.
Smith, President of American Airlines, stated.
To the basic pattern has been added route after
route, often in piecemeal fashion. It is quite obvious
that the paralleling of duplicating services on some of
the routes has been overdone. The net result is that the
total of traffic is insufficient to provide a reasonable
economic opportunity for all carriers operating there.
Talk of mergers among the trunks was supported not only by
many airline officials, but by their government counterparts.
These observers contemplated a series of mergers that would pro-
duce five or six surviving trunk lines. Airline officials
^"""Regulation by Due Process," Business Week , October 3,
I960, p. 54.
47Richard J. Barber, "Airline Mergers, Monopoly, and the
CAB," Journal of Air Law and Commerce
. Winter 1961-62, p. 1#9.
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received particular encouragement from the Civil Aeronautics
Board Chairman, Alan Boyd, a few months after the United-Capital
a 48merger was approved.
I hope that others of the eleven domestic trunk lines
now in existence will merge in the future. .. .Time may be
running out for some carriers to receive what they and
their investors consider to be a fair price for merging
into other companies.
It is altogether possible that financial conditions
in the industry may become worse before they become bet-
ter than they are now.
Mr. Boyd's statement was in line with the Administration's
aviation policy spelled out in 1954 by the President's Air Co-
ordinating Committee:
^
7
Plans should be developed for consolidation of trunk-
lines into a more limited number of systems, capable of
self-sufficient operation while carrying their fair share
of uneconomical and developmental service.
The present trunkline route pattern is highly com-
petitive. While it is important to have enough competition
to assure the aggressive promotion of service needed by the
public, there is a point of diminishing returns beyond
which competition can be self-defeating. Healthy, finan-
cially independent carriers can provide the public with
better service—and more effective competition—than a
larger number of marginal carriers.
Several mergers (reference Table 13) involving domestic
trunk airlines were consummated just prior to the start of the
jet age. But, in the opinion of Dr. Frederick, the CAB's merger
50policy was only partially successful.
48New York Times , November 4, 1961, p. 46.
^Civil Air Policy . The Air Coordinating Committee, May,
1954, U. S. Government Printing Office, p. 13.
Frederick, ojd. cit
. ,
p. 196.
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The power to approve mergers has not been used
as an affirmative weapon of Board policy, perhaps be-
cause of the Board's belief that the most effective
method of overcoming the difference in size of carriers
was through the award of new route certificates.
Table 13. Mergers and acquisitions involving domestic trunk
airlines: 1952-1960.51
Effective
date
Surviving
airline
Absorbed
airline
April 10, 1952 Western Inland Air Lines, Inc.
August 16, 1952 Braniff Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.
May 1, 1953 Delta Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc.
April 1, 1955 Continental Pioneer Air Lines, Inc.
June 1, 1956 Eastern Colonial Airlines, Inc.
Beginning with the New York-Chicago route certificate case
(decided in September, 1955), the CAB awarded route extensions
"that broadened the route systems of all of the domestic trunk-
line carriers to a greater or lesser extent. In many of these
route awards, selected carriers were authorized to operate over
52
routes already served by other carriers." As a result of the
Board's route policy, too many systems may have been created.
By 1962, there were eight major lines flying between New York
and Washington; five between New York and Boston; four between
53
New York and Chicago; and four between New York and Detroit.
The CAB is specifically directed by Section 408 (b) of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to approve proposed mergers when
^1CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics . 1962, op., cit
. ,
p.
515.
52
Samuel B. Richmond, "Creating Competition Among Airlines,"
Journal of Air Law and Commerce , Autumn 1957, p. 435.
.
53Airlines 1964 . op . cit . , p. 16.
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54
not inconsistent with the public interest. During the jet
conversion period, the only merger approved and consummated by
the CAB was Capital Airlines into United. Capital Airlines may
have been in a distinct category because of its bankrupt con-
dition. Prior to its merger with United, Capital was the fifth
largest domestic airline. After profitable operations from 1947
to 1955, the airline suffered severe losses, and by mid-1960 its
net worth was &3.7 million as compared with a 1955 value of
$17.1 million.^ 5 In March, I960, Capital was faced with the
possibility of foreclosure by Vickers-Armstrong Aircraft, Lim-
ited, to which secured promissory notes in excess of $10 million
were due. Capital filed a request with the CAB for subsidy
assistance at the rate of $13 million annually. The Board de-
clined. Then a proposal was filed to merge Capital into United
and to transfer Capital's route certificates to United. This
was approved.
There is no "typical" domestic trunk airline. Route assign-
ments alone create vast differences between the airlines. Two
airlines having the same characteristics of size, volume of
traffic, and operations, but having a different number of sta-
tions, will experience different cost levels and perhaps use
different types of aircraft. The nature of many airline routes
54Federal Aviation Act of 1953 . Section 408 (b), p. 43.
^CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics 1962 . op. cit
. ,
p. 355
;>0"Merger an(^ Monopoly in Domestic Aviation," Columbia Law
Review
. May, 1962, p. $51.
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is seasonal due to weather, which again creates differences in
costs. But the major difference is size. Four of the domestic
trunks control over 70 percent of the passenger traffic, as re-
flected in Table 14.
Table 14. Domestic trunk carrier participation in revenue
passenger miles scheduled services: 1955-1961.5'
Carrier ! Percent of total
J
1955 ; 1959
m
1961
Big Four
American
Eastern
TWA
United
22.2% 20.0%
17.4 15.7
14.9 16.3
19.6 17.2
20.0%
13.6
14.4
25.?
Total Big Four 74.1% 69.2% 73.3%
Other Trunks
Braniff 3.1% 3.3% 3.6%
Capital 4.1 5.7
Continental 1.2 2.4 3.0
Delta 5.0 5.5 7.4
National 4.4 3.9 3.8
Northeast 0.6 1.9 2.5
Northwest 4.3 4.9 3.5
Western 2.7 3.2 2.9
Others 0.5
25.9%Total Other Trunks 30. a% 26.7%
American and Eastern made their bid for merger approval in
1961, contending that: 5o
(1) the present state of the airline industry calls
for immediate steps to restore its health, (2) mergers
are the only realistic remedy for the airlines' ills,
57Ameri can -Eastern Merger Case , op . cit . . Appendix 37.
58
American-Eastern Merger Case , op . cit . . p. 3.
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(3) the American-Eastern merger is an eminently logical
one, (4) the American-Eastern merger will benefit the
industry generally and will not adversely affect other
carriers. (5) the governing law requires approval of the
merger, (6) only the customary labor-protective provi-
sions and the route restrictions to which the applicants
have agreed should be made conditions of approval, (7)
the intrinsic nature of their route structures preclude
sound economic conditions, (&) the merger will enable ex-
pense savings of $50 million annually and capital savings
of $100 million, (9) employment security and opportunity
will be enhanced by the merger, and (10) the merger will
assure stronger competition rather than create monopoly.
Several factions urged CAB denial of approval for the
American and Eastern merger. Among them were all of the other
domestic trunkline carriers (except Western), several local-
service carriers, organizations representing a major part of the
employees of the two applicants, and interested cities whose ex-
50
isting service might be affected. 7
One observer of the merger movement in 1961 expressed his
60
feelings as follows:
What is distressingly unclear, however, is the need
and desirability of the various consolidations contem-
plated. Perhaps they will have private advantages
to the extent they do, there is likely to be serious
public detriment. Competition will be reduced and the
imbalance that prevails in the industry—with four car-
riers now accounting for over 70 percent of the passenger
traffic, the remainder divided among seven other partici-
pants—is perpetuated, if not actually emphasized.
Following is a summary of the findings of the CAB in the
Lcan-Ea
the merger:
Americ stern Merger Case, and its reasons for disapproving
61
59American-Eastern Merger Case
,
op . cit., p. 4.
Barber, pjo. cit., p. 1#9.
American -Eastem Merger Case , op . cit . . p. viii.
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1. The merger would result in creating a monopoly in the
high-density traffic markets in the northeastern area of the
United States.
2. The merger would not be consistent with the public
interest.
3. The decline of profits of the trunkline air carriers
has not been established as caused primarily by excessive com-
petition.
4. The merger would result in a concentration of resources
and power in the merged carrier which would enable it to domi-
nate trunkline air transportation in the United States and would
make impossible the continuation of the Board's policy of main-
taining competition between the Big Four carriers and between
the Big Four and the other air carriers.
5. The merger is not required as a business necessity.
American has led the industry in load factors and stood above
average in rate of return on investment (reference Tables 9 and
12). Eastern's difficulties are temporary in nature and are
due to its delay in acquiring jets, uneconomic scheduling of
flights, and unfavorable publicity due to Electra Aircraft
accidents.
The merger attempts came at the low point in the jet con-
version recession of 1961. The industry was losing $34.6 mil-
lions, and although the CAB officially encouraged mergers
initially, the airlines were not able to come up with the
merger formulas that won official approval. The industry
steadfastly insisted that declining profits were due primarily
36
to excessive competition. The CAB, just as firmly, insisted
that excess capacity, rather than excess routes, was to blame
62
for the decline in profits.
A Confusing Passenger Fare Schedule
Increased competition between the trunkline carriers led to
another jet age problem which is often referred to as the "do-
mestic fare chaos." This problem caused confusion and fum-
bling within the industry, as well as out where it affected the
passenger. One observer noted that the tariff structure "has
become so muddled that it now pays a passenger to shop airline
ticket offices for bargain rates." * A New York airline ticket
agent claimed that 123 different possibilities in price were
available to a family of four flying between New York City and
65Miami. The ticket buyer has to consider the various costs of
day fares, night fares, jet fares, piston fares, first-class
fares, and a lot more.
Airlines were quite restricted in their choice of jet air-
craft—not by government controls—but by types of aircraft to
choose from. The result was that each airline operated equip-
"^"Setback for Airline Mergers," Business Week . December 1,
1962, p. 31.
^"Boyd Warns of Sterner CAB Fare Policy," Aviation Week
and Space Technology
. January 27, 1964, p. 42.
*L. L. Doty, "CAB Seeks to End Domestic Fare Chaos,"
Aviation Week and Space Technology . January 13, 1964, p. 34.
6
^James H. Winchester, "How Fair is Air Fare?" Flying
.
October, 1963, p. 34.
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ment quite similar to his competitor's, at approximately the
same speed, and for approximately the same cost. This situation
left little room for management to maneuver. As competition be-
tween airlines increased (or was permitted to increase), there
was a marked trend toward product differentiation. Product dif-
ferentiation took various forms, including differences in sched-
uling and in-flight and ground services. Price competition and
service competition were inseparably intertwined to create the
passenger fare problem.
In 195^, domestic trunk airlines found re-equipment pro-
grams still not completely financed, traffic growth slowing,
declining passenger load-factors, and rapidly shrinking profits.
The remedy first proposed by almost all the carriers was that a
substantial increase in the level of fares be authorized. In
a series of decisions in 195#, the CAB permitted fare increases
and reductions or eliminations of discounts. These actions pro-
duced an overall fare increase in excess of 10 percent for the
industry. ' The rates continued to rise sharply through 1962.
During the four year period 1959-1962, the average rate col-
lected per passenger mile was up 21 percent over the 195# rate.
(The consumer price index during the same period increased 3*4
percent.) Table 15 illustrates these increases in fare.
One result of these increases was the switch by growing
numbers of travelers from higher-priced first-class seats to
Hector, ojd. cit .
,
p. 102.
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CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics 1963 . op . cit., p. 482,
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Table 15. Illustrative fare increases: 1954-1962.
63
*
(One-wa)r fares, tax excluded)
Month/year New York-Los Angeles : New York-Chicago
.
First class .' Coach !
•
First class! Coach
July 1954 $153. 35 $ 99.00 $ 45.10 $ 33.00
July 1957 153.85 99.00 45.10 33.00
July 1953 166.25 104.00 47.95 35.35
July 1959
Add for Jet
166.25
10.00
104.00
10.00
47.95
3.00
35.35
3.00
July I960
Add for Jet
171.45
10.00
109.15
10.00
50.15
3.00
33.30
3.00
July 1961
Add for Jet
171.45
10.00
109.15
10.00
50.15
3.00
33.30
3.00
July 1962
Add for Jet
176.60
10.00
112.45
32.65
51.70
3.05
39.45
3.25
lower-priced coach seats on the same planes (reference Fig. 2
and Table 7). Coach traffic, as a percentage of revenue pas-
senger miles, increased from 41.1 percent in 1953 to 66.7 percent
in 1963. Coach and other special fares had been offered by the
airlines for many years, but the jets led to two-class service
and multiple rates in $6 million aircraft with cabins divided
into first-class and coach compartments. The price gap between
first-class and coach fares brought about a rapid decline in
first-class passenger load factors and an equally rapid increase
in coach load factors.
What is the difference between these two services? Both
68
Barber, ojd. cit . . p. 198.
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classes of passengers depart and arrive at the same time, but
there the similarity ends. The coach fare is usually about 25
percent lower than first-class. For coach, there may be no seat
reservations and the waiting lines at loading gates are usually
longer than waiting lines for first-class seats. Using Eastern
Airline's DC-S jet flight between New York and Miami as an ex-
69
ample, some of the differences can be noted. In the coach
compartment of the 63-foot long, ll^-foot wide cabin, there are
102 seats, arranged three-abreast on either side with a 16-inch
aisle down the center. The coach seats are 17 inches wide with
33 inches between rows. By contrast, first-class seats number
28 and are arranged two seats on each side of a 22-inch aisle.
The seats are 22 inches wide with 40 inches between rows. Fur-
ther, the first-class seats are located forward of the jet's
engines in a relatively quiet area. The physical differences
between the two classes primarily involve spaciousness and com-
fort, but they extend to food and other air and ground services
too. On this Eastern flight, two stewardesses were assigned to
the 102 seat coach section, while two stewardesses served the
28-seat first-class compartment. On the ground, Eastern pro-
vided separate waiting rooms with more "free" extras for the
first-class passenger.
That the majority of the airlines' customers did not think
first-class service worth the extra cost was evident in the in-
creasing percentage of coach revenue miles (reference Table 7).
69V 7Flying
. op . cit .. p. 105.
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However, the increasing trend of coach traffic was held to a
1.1 percent gain over first-class traffic in 1963, as compared
to gains of 5.6 percent, 8.6 percent, and 7.8 percent in I960,
1961, and 1962, respectively. Credit for this significant in-
crease in first-class passenger traffic without draining traffic
away from coach traffic is given primarily to the introduction
of the first-class family plan discount. Under the plan a pas-
senger holding a first-class ticket could take his wife and
members of his family at half fare. The combined cost was less
70
than the cost of an equal number of coach seats.
Numerous other promotional fare schemes were introduced by
airlines in an effort to hold their present share of the market
and gain new customers. Some of the main ideas were: (1) single-
class service used by United with a price set between the first-
class and coach fares of other airlines; (2) three-class service
used by TWA and Continental which includes a "standard" class
priced between first-class and coach—similar in price to
United' s single-class; and (3) reduced rates to military per-
sonnel traveling on leave. All such special-rate traffic re-
sulted in a lower yield per seat. If such traffic filled seats
that would otherwise be empty, the airline gained; but if regu-
lar traffic took advantage of lower fares, airline revenues
were depressed. Mr. L. L. Doty, Transport Editor of Aviation
Week and Space Technology , states the airlines' rate war "raises
70
"Family Fare Plan Producing Shift to First Class as
Traffic Climbs," Aviation Week and Space Technology . August 19,
1963, p. 39.
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an old question that has never been properly answered: Will
lower fares open up enough new markets to offset a drop in reve-
71
nue yield per passenger?"
If the answer is negative, this would indicate a basic
weakness in airline management— lack of a pricing technique,
a major factor in any business. CAB chairman, Alan S. Boyd,
speaking to an audience of airline officials and others associ-
ated with the industry in January, 1964, stated that it was time
for both his organization and the airline industry "to work out
some kind of fare policy or philosophy." He admitted that the
CAB had no fare policy and added, "I don't think any of the air-
lines have a fare policy, either." A United Air Lines official
at the meeting commented, "I think the airlines have individual
fare policies, but there is no policy for the industry as a
12
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whole." Mr. Doty commented on the industry's fare policy as
follows:
Widespread differences in operating and promotional
philosophies within the industry have prevented any single
position in formulating a basic fare structure. As a re-
sult, fares are now being used as competitive tools and
some carriers are forced to adopt fares they bitterly
oppose in order to compete effectively.
Consequently, tariffs are without uniformity and have
degenerated into a complex structure that turns what should
be a simple task of preparing a ticket into a complicated
mathematics problem for ticket agents. Tariff revisions
involved in the American (Air Lines) fare adjustments re-
quire 35 pages and include more than 300 separate pro-
visions and restrictions affecting new rates.
''Doty, op. cit., p. 34.
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I.
'•^Doty, op., cit .. p. 34,
nBoyci Warns of Sterner CAB Fare Policy," op. cit . . pp.
42-43*
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Another opinion of the industry's price policies and re-
74lated actions is expressed below.
Fares and their application to seating configura-
tion have been the center of a competitive roustabout
which has created a merchandising performance about as
subtle as a gasoline station price war. Lack of thought-
ful pricing tactics has caused confusion for the passen-
ger that is compounded by advertising programs devoted
to explaining why he should or should not like first-
class service—or any of the other varieties offered.
During the fracas, the CAB has stood aside without
using its regulatory powers so that airlines, which have
historically pleaded with the Board for the right to use
their managerial prerogatives, have been left to act
freely and have only themselves to blame for the rates
and fare dilemma
.
An indication of the intensity of the rate war is reflected
in the results of an analysis of airline advertising themes by
Printers ' Ink. Their survey of non-business travelers showed
that "speed" and "comfort" are the main associations of air
travel. Yet, the analysis "of more than 1000 airline adver-
tisements showed that highly competitive copy themes prevail in
almost three-fourths of the ads," and that "the positive assoc-
iation of speed and comfort did not show to any extent as dom-
inant themes in the analysis of copy content."^
At the beginning of the jet age the airlines united in a
struggle to raise fares. When the passenger traffic growth rate
resumed its climb in 1963, several (though not all) airlines
started moving in the opposite direction by forcing passenger
74Doty, March 16, 1964, 0£. cit.. p. 161.
75
"Do Airlines Ignore the Ripest Market?" Printers ' Ink
.
March, 1964, p. 7.
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rates down. Most of the special fares had the effect of re-
ducing the cost of air transportation to the traveler.'
Other Significant Problems
The problems outlined were by no means the only problems
faced by the airline industry during the jet conversion period.
Two other significant problems were: (1) the unusual series of
service interruptions due to labor disputes, and (2) a soft
77
market for disposal of unneeded used piston aircraft.
During the period 1958 through 1962, all trunklines except
three (Delta, Northeast, and United) were involved in a total of
23 management -labor disputes. Each conflict lasted for an aver-
age of 24.7 days. Seventeen, or 74 percent, of the conflicts
78
resulted in suspension or interruption of flight schedules.
Second, as the large capacity jets came into operation, the
airlines faced the problem of disposing of #50 surplus piston-
type aircraft that were still in excellent condition. The
planes had cost about $330 million and had a book value of
$250 million at the time of disposal. '°
'°Doty, January 13 , 1964, ojd. cit . . p. 134.
77American -Eastern Merger Case , op . cit
.
,
p. 31.
78
CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics 1963 . op. cit
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p. 512,
79Frederick, op., cit., p. 34.
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SUMMARY
The problems outlined in this paper, namely paying for the
jets, excessive capacity, reduced income, increased competition,
and a confusing fare schedule were the major problems faced by
the domestic trunk airlines during the jet conversion period of
1953-1963.
Twice since World War II, the industry successfully accom-
plished rapid re-equipping programs: first in 1945-46, and
again in 1950-51. But neither was as drastic and costly as the
1953-63 jet conversion cycle. In that conversion the carriers
contracted for large numbers of $6 million aircraft. Total in-
vestment in the trunkline industry in 195# was &1.7 billion. By
the end of 1962, the industry investment in new jet airliners
alone exceeded $3 billion. In 1955-56, when the first round of
jet orders were placed, the industry had been forced to rely
primarily on debt financing. The industry's long-term debt to
total capitalization ratio increased from 28 percent in 1955, to
56 percent in I960, and to 66 percent in 1962.
Optimism prevailed in 1958 and early 1959 when the new jets
were introduced in limited numbers. Then, just when the high-
productivity jets were arriving in larger numbers, the growth
rate in passenger traffic declined substantially. Earnings were
suddenly depressed as traffic failed to grow and passenger car-
rying capacity increased. The industry passenger load factor—
the percentage of available seat miles sold—dropped from 61.
4
percent in 1959, to 56.2 percent in 1961.
The resulting financial problems led to increased competition
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between the trunks for the available traffic. The seriousness
of the industry's situation was manifest in two ways: (1) by
the flurry of merger proposals submitted by several airlines as
a method to survive the recession, and (2) by the chaotic sched-
ule of passenger fares which led to confusion and criticism. In
spite of its early endorsement of the merger approach, the Civil
Aeronautics Board permitted only one merger during the jet tran-
sitional period—that being between United Airlines and the
nearly bankrupt Capital Airlines.
How did the industry get itself into such a critical situa-
tion? Mr. Maurice Lethbridge of Eastern Airlines made this
comment in 1961:
For the past twelve years the airline industry has
done a very creditable job. It has multiplied fourfold
temporarily, and I am sincere in saying that temporarily
we are going through a dry period in which we find our-
selves with over competition and over supply.
There is no need of wasting time trying to find out
how we got where we are. We all had a hand in it. Some
people like to blame the CAB. We don't think that is the
case. We in the industry are as responsible for today's
problems as the CAB or the Government or any other Gov-
ernment bureau.
We, in the late 1950' s, had eyes bigger than our
stomachs, and already one person, one industry, one air-
line, has died with a good big stomach ache. It's gone.
Another one is very shaky, and there are others that are
slipping, nervously.
Never before in the history of our business have we
needed more cooperation and understanding between the
governmental agencies and our own industry.
80
"The Issues and Challenges of Air Transportation,"
Symposium, 1961, p. 14.
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The problem of over competition is something for
which we are going to have to turn to the CAB for solu-
tion. The problem of over supply and production is our
own baby, and we have got to find ways out of it.
What did the jet conversion cost the industry and its
owners in lost earnings? Assuming the 10^ percent rate of re-
turn on invested capital established by the CAB is a valid
estimate of what the airline industry needs to earn in order to
attract investors, an earnings deficiency may be approximated.
During the years 1956 through 1962, an earnings deficiency of
approximately $550 million is calculated in Table 16.
Table 16. Estimated earnings deficiency of the domestic trunk-
line operations 1956-1962. 81
: Total "' Desired ' Actual : Earnings
Year 5 investment* > return** • return : deficiency
($000 Omitted)
1956 $ 711,159 $ 74,672 $68,271 1 6,401
1957 903,663 94,385 43,376 51,509
1958 1,066,853 112,020 69,346 42,674
1959 1,320,673 138,671 93,768 44,903
I960 1,579,640 165,862 44,230 121,632
1961 1,333,263 193,018 27,574 165,444
1962 1,933,113 203,502 85,277 118,225
Total Deficiency 1956-1962 £550,788
*Stockholder equity plus long-term debt.
**CAB recommended 10.5 percent.
81CAB Handbook of Airline Statistics , op . cit
.
, and Air
Transportation 1963 . op . cit .
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The Industry Today
While the Jet Age brought greatly improved public transpor-
tation service to American commerce, the postal service, and to
national defense, it did not, until 1963, begin to bring finan-
cial success for the domestic trunk airline industry. During
the first half of 1963 only three airlines lost money—Eastern,
go
Northeast, and TWA. The airlines are still heavily in debt
with a debt/equity financing ratio of 60 percent /40 percent, but
the steep rise in interest and depreciation expense has leveled
go
off to a very slow rate of change (refer to Fig. 1).
Initial industry passenger traffic forecasts for 1963 esti-
mated a growth of 5-7 percent in passenger revenue miles over
1962 traffic. Actual growth in passenger revenue miles neared
13 percent, as presented in Table 17.
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Table 17. Increase of 1963 domestic trunk traffic over 1962.
1963 traffic
Percent increase
over 1962 traffic
(000 omitted)
Number of passengers 51,996 \\.2°h
Revenue passenger miles 35,965,459 13.0%
Freight ton miles 521,350 10.0%
Express ton miles 65,463 ^'^5
U.S. mail ton miles 167,160 4.3%
Total revenue ton miles 4,220,259 11.9%
->
^2
"Airlines Pull Over the Hump," Business Week . September 7,
1963, p. 133.
^"Airlines Attain Maturity," 0£. cit
. ,
p. 5.
"Airlines See Across-The-Board Growth," American Aviation .
January, 1964, 27:42.
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Two factors brightened the financial picture for the jet
operating airlines: (1) the improvement in the national economic
picture; and (2) the exceptionally high productivity of the jets.
United Air Lines' Curtis Barkes, Vice President for Finance and
Property, said, "the upturn in the general economy and the quick-
ened tempo of business activity. . .resulted in a large volume of
air travel." ' But more significantly, the jet-powered aircraft
itself, with its high degree of operating reliability, produc-
tivity, and efficiency, enabled most operators to develop break-
even load factors in the 40-50 percent range—significantly below
the 1963 industry average passenger load factor of 54 percent.
Current earnings are less than satisfactory (on the basis
of the CAB desired rate), and financial prosperity is not uni-
form among the carriers. But on the basis of 1963 operations,
most domestic trunks made a successful financial recovery and
transition into the jet age.
A bright spot in the industry's future is that it now has
the seating capacity to handle the projected passenger growth up
to the 1970's without further major equipment expenditures. Cap-
ital needs for possible further expansion of air freight and for
smaller passenger jets will continue, but these requirements
should not be as large as the investment at the beginning of the
jet age. Domestic trunklines ordered 194 jet transports for de-
livery in 1964 and 1965—an increase of 55 percent over the 354
jets in domestic trunkline operation at the end of 1963 . Some of
^William V. Henzey, "Trunks Zoom Towards Top Earnings,"
American Aviation . September, 1963, 27:23.
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these jets will replace propeller equipment that accounted for
17.5 percent of the domestic air route passenger miles flown in
1963. a6
David W. Bluestone, chief of CAB's Planning Office, stated
that "a relatively long-term favorable profit" probably is ahead
for the airline industry, but "it may not reach the desired goal
37
of 10.5 percent return on investment.
Ralph L. Wiser, CAB Hearing Examiner in the American-
Eastern merger proposal, commented in 1963 about the industry's
88
health:
The consensus of most carriers is reasonable in
concluding that the air transport industry has passed
the more critical points in the present crisis, which
was due primarily to jet re-equipment problems and the
failure of traffic to grow as expected, and is again on
the way to successful earning positions.
A few skeptics paint a less rosy picture concerning the
industry's current health. George Hitchings, American Airline's
Chief Economist, stated that "profits are still not adequate,"
and pointed to the industry's thin profit margin (2 percent
after taxes) and low return on invested capital (3.5 percent).
Continuing problems are (1) excessive competition and
(2) pricing. The CAB is actively pursuing a policy of creating
'
competition on routes where it is felt necessary. For example,
^"Passenger-Mile Revenue Declines," Aviation Week and
Space Technology , June 15, 1964, p. 40.
87"Long-Term Airline Prospects Seem Bright," Aviation Week
and Space Technology . November 16, 1964, p. 39.
°°American-Eastern Merger Case , op. cit . , p. 32.
^"Airlines," Forbes . January 1, 1964, p. 29.
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recent action created competition for United on four important
routes by authorizing American and Northwest to operate on the
same routes. United had operated on these routes without com-
90petition since the United-Capital merger in 19ol. Mr. Robert .
Hotz, Editor of Aviation Week and Space Technology , stated that
"pricing continues to be vexatious, although the dimensions of
this problem have diminished and it no longer presents the
economic knife-edge balancing act between success and disaster
91that it did a few years ago.
A new generation of top management is moving into the air-
line industry. Six of the eleven domestic trunks now or soon
will have new presidents, but it is doubtful that they will find
time to relax in spite of the airlines' technical achievements
and now profitable jet operations. Mr. Doty, Transport Editor
of Aviation Week and Space Technology , believes that the follow-
ing are but a few of the many problems facing the entire industry
92
and new managements:
Foremost is the need to attain a financial stability
that will protect a stockholder's investment and insure
him an adequate return on that investment. This requires
new techniques to expand the consumer market and a long-
range fiscal planning program that will provide the
assets and capital resources which are necessary to ex-
ploit an enlarged market.
90
"Competition on 4 Runs of United Air Lines is Ordered by
CAB," Wall Street Journal . August 5, 1964.
917 Robert Hotz, "Airline Outlook," Aviation Week . June 8,
1964, p. 11.
92Doty, op,, cit
. ,
p. 161.
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This report is concerned with an examination of the primary-
economic problems experienced by the American scheduled airline
industry during the jet conversion period of 1953 to 1963 and an
analysis of the financial effects of these problems.
The approach was to determine what factors caused the in-
dustry recession during the 1953-1963 jet conversion period;
what major industry problems developed; and the approximate fi-
nancial loss to the owners of the airlines involved.
Twice since World War II, the industry successfully accom-
plished rapid re-equipping programs: first in 1945-46 and again
in 1950-51. But neither was as drastic and costly as the 1953-
1963 jet conversion cycle. In that conversion the carriers
contracted for large numbers of $6 million aircraft. Total in-
vestment in the trunkline industry in 19 53 was $1.7 billion. By
the end of 1962, the industry investment in new jet airliners
alone exceeded &3 billion. In 1955-56 when the first round of
jet orders was placed, the industry had been forced to rely
primarily on debt financing. The industry's long-term debt to
total capitalization ratio increased from 23 percent in 1955 1 to
56 percent in I960, and to 66 percent in 1962.
Optimism prevailed in 1953 and early 1959 when the new jets
were introduced in limited numbers. Then, just when the high-
productivity jets were arriving in larger numbers, the growth
rate in passenger traffic declined substantially. Earnings were
suddenly depressed as traffic failed to grow and passenger car-
rying capacity increased. The industry passenger load factor
—
the percentage of available seat miles sold—dropped from 61.4
percent in 1959 to $6.2 percent in 1961.
The resulting financial problems led to increased competi-
tion between the trunks for the available traffic. The serious-
ness of the industry f s situation was manifest in two ways: (l)
by the flurry of merger proposals submitted by several airlines
as a method to survive the recession, and (2) by the chaotic
schedule of passenger fares which led to confusion and criticism.
In spite of its early endorsement of the merger approach, the
Civil Aeronautics Board permitted only one merger during the jet
transitional period—that being between United Airlines and the
nearly bankrupt Capital Airlines.
In late 1962 and early 1963, passenger traffic resumed a
favorable growth rate, airline revenues increased, the jets
proved to be even more productive and proficient costwise than
expected, and airlines found they could operate profitably even
with the continued comparatively low passenger load factors.
This short but serious recession cost the owners of the air-
lines over $500 million in lost earnings. Current earnings are
less than satisfactory, and financial prosperity is not uniform
among the carriers. But on the basis of 1963 operations, most
airlines made a successful financial recovery and transition
into the jet age.
